41078 Rifleman Peter Ellis, (1895-12/10/1917). "a general favourite"

RIFLEMAN P. ELLIS. 

Rifleman P. Ellis, reported as missing since October 12, is the third son of Mr and Mrs P. Ellis, of Wairio. He was born at Spar Bush 22 years ago and attended the Nightcaps school. He was farming with his father until be joined the Twentythird. Rifleman Ellis was a keen sportsman and follower of the Birchwood Hounds. He was of a quiet disposition and a general favourite.  -Southland Times, 8/1/1917.

October 12, 1917, was nothing short of a disaster.  In concise terms, soldiers were sent through knee-deep mud to attack German defences - concrete machine-gun posts surrounded by barbed wire - which had not been previously attacked by artillery.  The reason for this was that the guns had not been brought up - could not be brought up - through recently taken territory which, hundreds of years before, had been swamp and, over those hundreds of years, had been drained by local farmers.

Artillery and heavy rain had effectively reproduced the swamp. On the rises surround by the swamp the German Army made their defences.

The following are a few paragraphs from the Official History of the NZ Rifle Brigade from the fateful day of October 12, 1917. Peter Ellis served in the 3rd Battalion.

In the meantime, the main advance of the 2nd Battalion troops was becoming more and more difficult, and presently they were directly confronted by a line of German concrete "pill-boxes," heavily wired, surrounded by a sea of mud, and strongly manned. Beyond these, again, and on slightly higher ground, stood other concrete fortresses, and the grazing fire coming from this frontal position some 500 yards ahead, as well as enfilade fire from Bellevue on the right and from Source Trench well off on the left front, was now so intense and well directed that the general forward movement practically ceased. The centre of the line had suffered most heavily, and in consequence the left had swung up towards the Wallemolen Cemetery.

By this time the 3rd Battalion had come up, and the 1st was awaiting its turn to move. At 6.30 a.m. the leading troops of the 3rd had begun to pass through the rear companies of the 4th, but coming soon after within the zone of the machinegun fire deluging the troops of the 2nd Battalion, they realized all too surely that the expected capture of the first objective had not been accomplished. Maintaining perfect order, they pressed on with all speed, yet, in view of the uncertainty as to what lay before them, with due circumspection and care. Advantage was taken of the little cover afforded by shell-holes, and finally, by successive bounds, the irregular line of the 2nd Battalion was reached. Efforts were at once made to carry on the advance, but not all the added strength derived from the arrival of comparatively fresh troops could prevail against the deadly hail of bullets by which the line was swept. Some temporary improvement was made on the left. Lieut. F. J. L. Buchler, a 3rd Battalion company commander, pushed round the left of the Cemetery with a party of his men and succeeded in gaining a position well in advance. Here he was in touch with the Scottish troops, but presently the latter recoiled under the fierce fire from Source Trench, and Buchler and his men, now isolated and in danger of being cut off had finally to give way and work back to the Cemetery. Elsewhere attempt notably those by Company Sergt.-Majors F. W. H. Shepherd and C. A. Spriggs, and Sergeants L. F. Allan and T. A. Goodfellow, were made to establish advanced shell-hole posts and link them up, but these gallant endeavours resulted in no permanent advantage.

It was now becoming abundantly evident that our troops were being brought to a standstill. The casualties, which included practically the whole of the 3rd Battalion Headquarters, had been extremely heavy, and many of the companies and most of the platoons were without officers. The men of three units were inextricably intermingled, and even some of the Scottish troops found themselves scattered amongst our sections. All ranks were drenched to the skin and plastered with shell-hole slime from head to foot; a large proportion of the rifles and Lewis guns were choked with mud; and, taking advantage of the decrease in the volume of our fire, the enemy was rapidly reinforcing his forward line and even placing machine-guns on the top of his "pill-boxes." To Lieut.-Col Puttick, who made a personal reconnaissance of the position soon after 8 o'clock, the definiteness of the check and the utter futility of attempting to make further gains at once became apparent, and, being the senior officer on the spot, he ordered a cessation of the attack and gave instructions for the consolidation of the position secured. This consisted in the main of an old German trench on the farther side of the road running south-east from the Cemetery to a point slightly beyond Wolf Farm, with a few small groups of men in shell-holes about 100 yards in advance of the general line. It was thus roughly parallel to the main band of wire crossing Bellevue Spur, the lesser entanglements having been passed.

Soon after 9 a.m. the German artillery ranged fairly accurately on the new line, and kept up an intermittent fire upon it from that time onward. The enemy machine-gun fire now decreased in volume, but any movement on our part immediately drew heavy bursts from the many commanding positions above.

We had come so far short of achieving our object that the attack of October 12th must be considered a failure. The direct cause of the frustration of our efforts was the presence, along the whole of the enemy front, of the exceedingly strong band, or, rather, field of wire, the existence and nature of which had not been known until the evening of the 11th, after the Division had taken over the line, it having been left to our own patrols to make the discovery. The difficulties experienced by the artillery brigades in bringing forward the batteries, though all concerned had laboured with the utmost devotion and self-sacrifice, had in most cases proved to be insuperable. The result was that a large proportion of the guns never reached their positions. Again, for many of the pieces solid platforms could not be provided, and on being fired they rapidly sank into the oozy ground and became for the time being useless. Hence the advance of the infantry was insufficiently supported, but even in the face of this disadvantage we should doubtless have won through if the wire had been dealt with. It is true that von Arnim's system of strengthening the defence by means of concealed "pill-boxes" had by now reached the last stage of perfection, and that the concrete fortresses on the Passchendaele slopes had been most skilfully sited; but positions of this nature, as we proved often enough, are not necessarily impregnable provided the infantry are able to attack them at close quarters, especially if this can be done within a reasonable time after the heavy artillery has played its part.

Owing to the wet weather, the broken nature of the country, and the almost entire absence of duck-board tracks, the evacuation of the wounded was a serious matter, six, and sometimes eight men being required to bring out one stretcher-case; and as the task usually took six hours to accomplish, the bearers were exhausted after one journey, and rest was imperative. As an indication of the state of the country over which these duties, sufficiently difficult even where properly-formed tracks exist, had to be performed, it may be mentioned that Riflemen W. C. Turner and M. Hennessy were specially reported upon as having, while still under fire, rescued wounded men from drowning in the shell-holes. If ever the devoted stretcher-bearers were worthy of thanks and praise, it was doubly so on the sodden field of Passchendaele.

Peter Ellis was posted as missing and eventually his death was recorded. In common with so many New Zealanders who died attacking Bellevue Spur on that day, he has no known grave.

Wairio Cemetery.